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James Boyd Whitet
In this paper I shall suggest that law is most usefully seen not,
as it usually is by academics and philosophers, as a system of rules,
but as a branch of rhetoric; and that the kind of rhetoric of which
law is a species is most usefully seen not, as rhetoric usually is,
either as a failed science or as the ignoble art of persuasion, but as
the central art by which community and culture are established,
maintained, and transformed. So regarded, rhetoric is continuous
with law, and like it, has justice as its ultimate subject.
I do not mean to say that these are the only ways to under-
stand law or rhetoric. There is a place in the world for institutional
and policy studies, for taxonomies of persuasive devices, and for
analyses of statistical patterns and distributive effects. But I think
that all these activities will themselves be performed and criticized
more intelligently if it is recognized that they too are rhetorical. As
for law and rhetoric themselves, I think that to see them in the
way I suggest is to make sense of them in a more nearly complete
way, especially from the point of view of the individual speaker,
the individual hearer, and the individual judge.
I
Let us begin with the idea that the law is a branch of rhetoric.
Who, you may ask, could ever have thought it was anything else?
The ancient rhetorician Gorgias (in Plato's dialogue of that name)
defined rhetoric as the art of persuading the people about matters
of justice and injustice in the public places of the state,1 and one
could hardly imagine a more compendious statement of the art of
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the lawyer than that. A modern law school is, among other things,
a school in those arts of persuasion about justice that are peculiar
to, and peculiarly effective in, our legal culture. And the commit-
ment of the rhetorician to the cause of his client presents him, in
the ancient and the modern world alike, with serious (and similar)
problems of intellectual and personal integrity. How can it be that
law was ever regarded as anything but rhetoric?
The answer lies, I think, in two traditions-one old, the other
new-which I can summarize this way. The older (primarily Judaic
and Christian) tradition saw the law as a set of authoritative com-
mands, entitled to respect partly from their antiquity, partly from
their concordance with the law of nature and of God. In this view
law is not rhetoric but authority. The newer tradition is that of
institutional sociology, the object of which is to describe and ana-
lyze the structure and function of various social institutions, so far
as possible, from the point of view of "value-free" social science.
These institutions may of course have certain kinds of political au-
thority internal to the culture in which they are found, but they
are normally not seen as sources of true moral authority, as law
once was. With the apparent death of the first tradition in most
Western European (but not Islamic!) countries, we are left with the
second, and tend to view law as a system of institutionally estab-
lished and managed rules. Actually, as this conception has worked
itself out in practice it has led to a kind of substantive neutrality
(or emptiness) that makes it natural once again to see a connection
between modern law and ancient rhetoric, and to face-as Plato
did in the Gorgias-the great question of what talk about justice
can mean in a world as relativistic, adversarial, competitive, and
uncertain as ours is and Plato's was.
As a result, the law is at present usually spoken of (by aca-
demics at least) as if it were a body of more or less determinate
rules, or rules and principles, that are more or less perfectly intelli-
gible to the trained reader. Law is in this sense objectified and
made a structure. The question "What is law?" is answered by de-
fining what its rules are, or by analyzing the kinds of rules that
characterize it. The law is thus abstracted and conceptualized:
H.L.A. Hart's major book on jurisprudence was appropriately enti-
tled The Concept of Law.2 Sophisticated analysis of law from this
point of view distinguishes among various kinds of legal rules and
among different sets or subsets of legal rules: substantive rules are
2 HA. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw (1961).
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distinguished from procedural or remedial rules, or primary rules
from secondary rules, or legal rules from more general principles.
This idea of law and legal science fits with, and is perhaps de-
rived from, the contemporary conception of our public political
world as a set of bureaucratic entities, which can be defined in
Weberian terms as rationalized institutions functioning according
to ends-means rationality. These institutions have goals, purposes,
or aims, which they achieve more or less perfectly as they are
structured and managed more or less well.
In this way, the government (of which the law is a part) and in
fact the entire bureaucratic system, private as well as public, tends
to be regarded, especially by lawyers, managers, and other policy-
makers, as a machine acting on the rest of the world. This natu-
rally reduces the rest of the world to the object upon which the
machine acts. Human actors outside the governmental world are
made the objects of manipulation through a series of incentives or
disincentives. Actors within the legal-bureaucratic structure either
are "will-servers" (whose obligation is to obey the will of a political
superior) or are "choice-makers" (who are in a position of political
superiority charged with the responsibility of making choices, usu-
ally thought of as "policy choices," that affect the lives of others).
The choices themselves are likewise objectified: the items of choice
are broken out of the flux of experience and the context of life so
that they can be talked about in the bureaucratic-legal mode. This
commits the system to what is thought to be measurable (espe-
cially to what is measurable in material ways) to short-term goals,
and to a process of thought by calculation. The premises of cost-
benefit analysis are thus integral to the bureaucracy as we nor-
mally imagine it. Whatever cannot be talked about in these bu-
reaucratic ways is simply not talked about. Of course all systems of
discourse have domains and boundaries, principles of exclusion
and inclusion, but this kind of bureaucratic talk is largely unself-
conscious about what it excludes. The world it sees is its whole
world.
Law then becomes reducible to two features: policy choices
and techniques of their implementation. Our questions are "What
do we want?" and "How do we get it?" In this way the conception
of law as a set of rules merges with the conception of law as a set
of institutions and processes. The overriding metaphor is that of
the machine; the overriding value is that of efficiency, conceived of
as the attainment of certain ends with the smallest possible costs.
This is a necessarily crude sketch of certain ways in which law
is commonly thought of. Later in this paper, I will propose a differ-
[52:684
Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law
ent way of conceiving of law, which I think can be both more true
to its actual nature as practiced and more valuable to us as critics.
II
But I turn first to the meaning of "rhetoric." This term is in
great flux, and what I say must be somewhat less dogmatic than
my discussion of "law." It is my impression that rhetoric is at pre-
sent usually talked about in either of two modes. The first of these
is by comparison with science. The main claim of science is that it
contributes to knowledge by informing us of what is knowable in
the sense that it can be demonstrated. This is true both of deduc-
tive sciences, which establish propositions by demonstrating their
entailment in certain premises, and of inductive sciences, which es-
tablish, but with less certainty, propositions that can be regarded
as the most complete and economical accounts of the evidence
available to us, and hence as presumptively true. From this point
of view, rhetoric is thought of as what we do when science doesn't
work. Instead of dealing with what is "known," it deals with what
is probably the case. Thus in Aristotle the enthymeme is defined as
a syllogism based upon propositions that are themselves not neces-
sarily true but probable.3 So regarded, rhetoric is the art of estab-
lishing the probable by arguing from our sense of the probable. It
is always open to replacement by science when the truth or falsity
of what is now merely probable is finally established.
The other heading under which rhetoric is frequently dis-
cussed is explicitly pejorative: rhetoric is defined as the ignoble art
of persuasion. As I suggested above, this tradition has a history at
least as old as the Platonic dialogues, in which rhetoric is attacked
as a false art; it is also as contemporary as the standard modern
condemnations of government propaganda and of the kind of ad-
vertising practiced by the wizards of Madison Avenue.
To the extent that law is today regarded as a kind of rhetoric,
these two traditions establish the terms of analysis. In the court-
room the truth is never known, and each of the lawyers tries to
persuade the jury not of the truth, but that his (or her) view is
more probable than the other one (or that the other side has not
attained some requisite degree of probability). In doing so, each
lawyer employs untrustworthy arts of persuasion by which he seeks
to make his own case, even if it is the weaker one, appear the
stronger. Rhetoric, in short, is thought of either as a second-rate
3 ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 1357a23-33.
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way of dealing with facts that cannot really be properly known or
as a way of dealing with people instrumentally or manipulatively,
in an attempt to get them to do something you want them to do.
The tendency to think of rhetoric as failed science is especially
powerful in the pre-ent age, in which determined attempts have
been made to elevate, or to reduce, virtually every discipline to the
status of true science. The idea of science as perfect knowledge has
of course recently been subjected to considerable criticism, both
internal and external. It is now a commonplace that scientific crea-
tivity is imaginative, almost poetic; that scientific knowledge is
only presumptive, not certain; and that science is a culture that
transforms itself by principles that are not themselves scientific.
Yet the effort to make the language and conventions of science the
ruling model of our age, our popular religion, lives on in the lan-
guage and expectations of many people, especially of those who are
in fact not true scientists. Much of economic discourse, for exam-
ple, is deformed by the false claims of the discipline to the status
of perfect science, which leads to the embarrassing situation in
which economic speakers representing different political attitudes
couch their differences in scientific terms, each claiming that the
other is no true economist. This not only confuses the observer but
renders the field of economics less intelligible than it should be,
even to its participants, and it reduces important political differ-
ences, which might be the topic of real conversation, to the status
of primary assumptions.
III
I shall sketch out a somewhat different way of conceiving of
law, and indeed of governmental processes generally: not as a bu-
reaucratic but as a rhetorical process. In doing this, I shall also be
suggesting a way to think about rhetoric, especially that kind of
rhetoric-I call it "constitutive rhetoric"--of which law can I think
be seen as a species.
I want to start by thinking of law not as an objective reality in
an imagined social world, not as a part of a constructed cosmology,
but from the point of view of those who actually engage in its
processes, as something we do and something we teach. This is a
way of looking at law as an activity, and in particular as a rhetori-
cal activity.
I want to direct attention to three related aspects of the law-
yer's work. The first is the fact that the lawyer, like any rhetori-
cian, must always start by speaking the language of his or her audi-
ence, whatever it may be. This is just a version of the general truth
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that to persuade anybody you must in the first instance speak a
language that he or she regards as valid and intelligible. If you are
a lawyer, this means that you must speak either the technical lan-
guage of the law-the rules, cases, statutes, maxims, and so forth,
that constitute the domain of your professional talk-or, if you are
speaking to jurors or clients or the public at large, some version of
the ordinary English of your time and place. Law is in this sense
always culture-specific. It always starts with an external, empiri-
cally discoverable set of cultural resources into which it is an
intervention.
This suggests that one (somewhat circular) definition of the
law might be the particular set of resources made available by a
culture for speech and argument on those occasions, and by those
speakers, we think of as legal. These resources include rules, stat-
utes, and judicial opinions, of course, but much more as well: max-
ims, general understandings, conventional wisdom, and all the
other resources, technical and nontechnical, that a lawyer might
use in defining his or her position and urging another to accept
it. 4  To define "the law" in this way, as a set of resources for
thought and argument, is an application of Aristotle's traditional
definition of rhetoric, for the law in this sense is one set of those
"means of persuasion" that he said it is the art of rhetoric to
discover.5
In the law (and I believe elsewhere as well), these means of
persuasion can be described with some degree of accuracy and
completeness, so that most lawyers would agree that such-and-
such a case or statute or principle is relevant, and another is not.
But the agreement is always imperfect: one lawyer will see an anal-
ogy that another will deny, for example. And when attention shifts
to the value or weight that different parts of the material should
have, disagreement becomes widespread and deep. Ultimately,
then, the identity, the meaning, and the authority of the materials
are always arguable, always uncertain. There is a sense in which
' In light of the current view of law as a set of rules, it is worth stressing that while
.much legal argument naturally takes the form of interpreting rules, or redefining them, and
while some rules are obviously of greater authority than others, the material as a whole is
not structured as a set of rules with a hierarchical or other order, nor is it reducible to a set
of rules. The rule is often the subject as well as the source of argument, with respect to its
form, its content, and its relation to other rules. Perhaps the best way to understand what a
rule is, as it works in the legal world, is to think of it not as a command that is obeyed or
disobeyed but as the topic of thought and argument-as one of many resources brought to
bear by the lawyer and others both to define a question and to establish a way to approach
it.
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the materials can be regarded in the first instance as objective, ex-
ternal to the self; but they are always remade in argument. Their
discovery is, in a sense, an empirical process, their reformulation
and use an inventive or creative one.
This suggests that the lawyer's work has a second essential el-
ement, the creative process to which I have just alluded. For in
speaking the language of the law, the lawyer must always be ready
to try to change it: to add or to drop a distinction, to admit a new
voice, to claim a new source of authority, and so on. One's perform-
ance is in this sense always argumentative, not only about the re-
sult one seeks to obtain but also about the version of the legal dis-
course that one uses-that one creates-in one's speech and
writing. That is, the lawyer is always saying not only, "Here is how
this case should be decided," but also, "Here-in this language-is
the way this case and similar cases should be talked about. The
language I am speaking is the proper language of justice in our
culture." The legal speaker always acts upon the language that he
or she uses, to modify or rearrange it; in this sense legal rhetoric is
always argumentatively constitutive of the language it employs.
The third aspect of legal rhetoric is what might be called its
ethical or communal character, or its socially constitutive nature.
Every time one speaks as a lawyer, one establishes for the moment
a character-an ethical identity, or what the Greeks called an
ethos-for oneself, for one's audience, and for those one talks
about, and in addition one proposes a relation among the charac-
ters one defines. One creates, or proposes to create, a community of
people, talking to and about each other. The lawyer's speech is
thus always implicitly argumentative not only about the re-
sult-how should the case be decided?-and about the lan-
guage-in what terms should it be defined and talked about?-but
also about the rhetorical community of which one is at that mo-
ment a part. The lawyer is always establishing in performance a
response to the questions, "What kind of community should we,
who are talking the language of the law, establish with each other,
with our clients, and with the rest of the world? What kind of con-
versation should the law constitute, should constitute the law?"
Each of the three aspects of the lawyer's rhetorical life can b6
analyzed and criticized: the discourse one is given by one's culture
to speak; the argumentative reconstitution of it; and the argumen-
tative constitution of a rhetorical community in one's speech or
writing. The study of this process-of constitutive rhetoric-is the
study of the ways we constitute ourselves as individuals, as com-
munities, and as cultures, whenever we speak. To put this another
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way, the fact that the law can be understood as a comprehensibly
organized method of argument, or what I call a rhetoric, means
that it is at once a social activity-a way of acting with
others-and a cultural activity-a way of acting with a certain set
of materials found in the culture. It is always communal, both in
the sense that it always takes place in a social context and in the
sense that it is always constitutive of the community by which it
works. Both the lawyer and the lawyer's audience Jive in a world in
which their language and community are not fixed and certain but
fluid, constantly remade, as their possibilities and limits are tested.
The law is an art of persuasion that creates the objects of its per-
suasion, for it constitutes both the community and the culture it
commends.
This means that the process of law is at once creative and edu-
cative. Those who use this language are perpetually learning what
can and cannot be done with it as they try-and fail or suc-
ceed-to reach new formulations of their positions. It also means
that both the identity of the speakers and their wants are in per-
petual transformation. If this is right, the law cannot be a tech-
nique, as the bureaucratic model assumes, by which "we" get what
we "want," for both "we" and our "wants" are constantly remade
in the rhetorical process. The idea of the legal actor as one who is
either making policy choices himself (or herself) or obeying the
choices made by others is inadequate, for he is a participant in the
perpetual remaking of the language and culture that determines
who he is and who we are. The law is not merely a bureaucracy or
a set of rules, but a community of speakers of a certain kind: a
culture of argument, perpetually remade by its participants.
All three of these aspects of the lawyer's work flow from the
fact that the law is what I have called culture-specific, that is, that
it always takes place in a cultural context into which it is always an
intervention. But it is in a similar way socially specific: it always
takes place in a particular social context, into which it is also an
intervention. By this I mean nothing grand but simply that the
lawyer responds to the felt needs of others, who come to him or her
for assistance with an actual difficulty or problem. (These felt
needs may of course be partly the product of the law itself, and the
very "intervention" of the law can create new possibilities for
meaning, for motive, and for aspiration.) From this point of view,
the law can be seen, as it is experienced, not as a wholly indepen-
dent system of meaning, but as a way of talking about real events
and actual people in the world. It is a way of telling a story about
what has happened in the world and claiming a meaning for it by
1985]
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writing an ending to it. The lawyer is repeatedly saying, or imagin-
ing himself or herself saying: "Here is 'what happened,' here is
'what it means,' and here is 'why it means what I claim.'" The
process is at heart a narrative one because there cannot be a legal
case without a real story about real people actually located in time
and space and culture. Some actual person must go to a lawyer
with an account of the experience upon which he or she wants the
law to act, and that account will always be a narrative. The client's
narrative is not simply accepted by the lawyer but subjected to
questioning and elaboration, as the lawyer sees first one set of legal
relevances, then another. In the formal legal process, that story is
then retold, over and over, by the lawyer and by the client and by
others, in developing and competing versions, until by judgment or
agreement an authoritative version is achieved. This story will in
the first instance be told in the language of its actors. That is
where the law begins; in a sense that is also where it ends, for its
object is to provide an ending to that story that will work in the
world. And since the story both begins and ends in ordinary lan-
guage and experience, the heart of the law is the process of transla-
tion by which it must work, from ordinary language to legal lan-
guage and back again.
The language that the lawyer uses and remakes is a language
of meaning in the fullest sense. It is a language in which our per-
ceptions of the natural universe are constructed and related, in
which our values and motives are defined, and in which our meth-
ods of reasoning are elaborated and enacted. By defining roles and
actors, and by establishing expectations as to the propriety of
speech and conduct, it gives us the terms for constructing a social
universe. Law always operates through speakers located in particu-
lar times and places speaking to actual audiences about real peo-
ple; its language is continuous with ordinary language; it always
operates by narrative; it is not conceptual in its structure; it is per-
petually reaffirmed or rejected in a social process; and it contains a
system of internal translation by which it can reach a range of
hearers. All these things mark it as a rhetorical system.
IV
What I have said means something, I think, about what we
can mean by "rhetoric" as well as what we mean by "law." What I
have been describing is not merely an art of estimating probabili-
ties or an art of persuasion, but an art of constituting culture and
community. It is of this kind of rhetoric that I think the law is a
branch.
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Let me approach what I mean about rhetoric with a primitive
example, meant to suggest that what I call "constitutive rhetoric"
is actually the set of practices that most fully distinguish humans
from other animals. Imagine a bear fishing for salmon in a river of
the great Northwest. What is it doing? "Fishing," we say. Now im-
agine a man fishing in the same river for the same fish. What is he
doing? "Fishing," we say; but this time the answer has a different
meaning and a new dimension, for it is now a question, as it was
not before, what the fishing means to the actor himself. If a person
does it, it has a meaning of a kind it cannot otherwise have. Today
the meaning may well be that of sentimental escape to the wilder-
ness by one sportily clad in his L.L. Bean outfit, demonstrating his
place in a certain social class; but once-for a Native American
say-it might have been a religious meaning.
Whenever two people come together to fish (or hunt, or any-
thing else), they necessarily share the question of the meaning of
what they do. Their views may differ, and their differences may
reach the meaning of their relationship as well as that of their
common activity. There is, for example, the question of dominance
or equality. Is one following the other, or are they in some real
sense together? Do their views of the meaning of what they do co-
incide, and, if so, how do they know? Or is there tension or dishar-
mony between them, and, if so, what is to be done about that?
How long will the terms upon which they are proceeding remain
stable? The establishment of comprehensible relations and shared
meanings, the making of the kind of community that enables peo-
ple to say "we" about what they do and to claim consistent mean-
ings for it-all this at the deepest level involves persuasion as well
as education, and is the province of what I call constitutive
rhetoric.
Let me expand my example a bit. Think of the kind of opposi-
tion that begins the Iliad, the opposition between two male human
beings quarreling over a female. From one point of view, this is just
like two other male mammals doing the same thing, say two male
bears or dogs. But from another point of view there is a completely
new dimension added to the dispute: the question of what it means
from each point of view, including that of the woman. It is from
such a dispute, and from the claims of competing meanings for the
events involved, that arose both the Trojan War (at least in Greek
myth) and-much more importantly-from our point of view the
Iliad itself. Agamemnon and Achilles are engaged in a struggle. At
some level, the struggle is an animal one, with will opposed to will.
It is also a human struggle, a struggle over what ought to be done,
1985]
The University of Chicago Law Review
and why, and this is a struggle over meaning: what it means for
Agamemnon to be deprived of a prize, or of this woman, or for
Achilles to be deprived of a prize, or of this woman. (At moments
in this poem, attention is directed to what such struggles mean
from the point of view of the women themselves, for example in
the cases of Helen and Andromache.6 )
Once the quarrel has begun and Achilles has separated himself
from the other Achaeans, the question shifts to what that means,
and, as time goes on, to how the quarrel might be made up. "Mak-
ing up" a quarrel is a process in which the parties gradually, and
often with great difficulty, come to share a common language for
the description of their common past, present, and future, includ-
ing an agreement as to what will be passed over in silence. In this
process, they reestablish themselves as a community with a culture
of their own. In the Iliad, Agamemnon's attempts to make up the
quarrel fail; the community between the two antagonists is never
reestablished, even when Achilles returns to the battle (because
this happens for a different reason, the death of Patroclus).
Or think of another great literary moment, the beginning of
Paradise Lost, when Satan and the other rebellious angels try to
establish a community of their own in Hell, based upon a new lan-
guage of value and meaning. Their incredible attempts at self-crea-
tion and self-assertion have won them the admiration of many
readers from Shelley onwards; some even see Satan as the unac-
knowledged hero of the poem. ("The mind is its own place, and in
it self / Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of Heav'n."7 ) But the
poem shows that no community can be built upon the language
that they use, a language of selfishness and hatred-a language
that in fact made a "Hell of Heav'n"-even by figures with such
enormous capacities of imagination and will as Milton represents
the angels to have. Compare with this the efforts of the partici-
pants at our own Constitutional Convention in the summer of
1787, who were also trying to find or make a language, and a set of
relations, upon which a new community could be made and upon
which a new life could proceed. Their arguments can be read as the
gradual attempt to make a language of shared factual assumptions,
shared values, shared senses of what need and what need not be
said-of what could be said ambiguously, of what they could not
resolve at all-resulting in a text that they could offer to others as
the terms on which a new community might begin its tentative life.
6 HOMER, ILIAD bk. 11, 11. 121-244; bk. VI, 11. 342-58, 404-39.
7 JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST bk. I, II. 255-56 (1st ed. London 1667).
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What kind of community shall it be? How will it work? In
what language shall it be formed? These are the great questions of
rhetorical analysis. It thus always has justice and ethics-and
politics, in the best sense of that term-as its ultimate subjects.
The domain of constitutive rhetoric, as I think of it, thus in-
cludes all language activity that goes into the constitution of actual
human cultures and communities. Even the kind of persuasion
Plato called dialectic, in which the speaker is himself willing, even
eager, to be refuted, is in this sense a form of rhetoric, for it is the
establishment of community and culture in language.
V
Like law, rhetoric invents; and, like law, it invents out of
something rather than out of nothing. It always starts in a particu-
lar culture and among particular people. There is always one
speaker addressing others in a particular situation, about concerns
that are real and important to somebody, and speaking a particular
language. Rhetoric always takes place with given materials. One
cannot idealize rhetoric and say, "Here is how it should go on in
general." As Aristotle saw-for his Rhetoric is, for the most part, a
map of claims that are persuasive in his Greek world-rhetoric is
always specific to its material. There is no Archimedean point from
which rhetoric can be viewed or practiced.
This means that the rhetorician-that is, each of us when we
speak to persuade or to establish community in other ways-must
accept the double fact that there are real and important differ-
ences among cultures and that each person is to a substantial de-
gree the product of his or her own culture. The rhetorician, like the
lawyer, is engaged in a process of meaning-making and commu-
nity-building of which he or she is in part the subject. To do this
requires him or her to face and to accept the condition of radical
uncertainty in which we live: uncertainty as to the meaning of
words, uncertainty as to their effect on others, uncertainty as to
our own character and motivations. The knowledge out of which
the rhetorician ultimately functions will not be scientific or theo-
retical but practical, experiential-the sense that one knows how
to do things with language and with others. This is, in fact, our
earliest social and intellectual knowledge, the knowledge we ac-
quire as we first begin to move and act in our social universe and
learn to speak and understand. It is the knowledge by which lan-
guage and social relations are made.
The rhetorician thus begins not with the imagined individual
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in imagined isolation (as Hobbes8 or Locke 9 does), and not with
the self, isolated from all of its experience except that of cogitation
(as Descartes does"0 ), but where Wittgenstein tells us to begin,
with our abilities of language, gesture, and meaning.11 This knowl-
edge is itself not reducible to rules or subject to expression in rules,
though many analysts wish that it were; rather it is the knowledge
by which we learn to manage, evade, disappoint, surprise, and
please each other, as we understand the expectations that others
bring to what we say. This knowledge is not provable in the scien-
tific sense, nor is it logically rigorous. For these reasons, it is unset-
tling to the modern scientific and academic mind. But we cannot
go beyond it, and it is a mistake to try. In this fluid world without
turf or ground, we cannot walk but we can swim. And we need not
be afraid to do this-to engage in the rhetorical process of life-for
all of us, despite our radical uncertainties, already know how to do
it. By attending to our own experience, and that of others, we can
learn to do it better if we try.
VI
What would be the effects of thinking of law in this literary
and rhetorical way? If, as I think, it is more true to the experiences
of those engaged in the activity of law than the standard concep-
tual accounts, it should in the first place lead to a richer and more
accurate understanding of and control over what we do. The law is
something that lawyers themselves make all the time, whenever
they act as lawyers, not something that is made by a political sov-
ereign. From this point of view, the law can be defined as the cul-
ture that we remake whenever we speak as lawyers. To look at law
this way is to direct one's attention to places that are normally
passed over: to the way in which we create new meanings, new pos-
sibilities for meaning, in what we say; to the way in which our liter-
ature can be regarded as a literature of value and motive and senti-
ment; to the way in which our enterprise is a radically ethical one,
by which self and community are perpetually reconstituted; and to
the limits that our nature and our culture, our circumstances and
our imagination, place on our powers to remake our languages and
communities in new forms.
To see law this way may also lead to a different way of reading
8 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 13 (London 1651).
9 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT bk. II, chs. 1-3 (London 1690).
10 REN9 DESCARTES, DISCOURS DE LA MkTHODE pt. 4 (Leiden 1637).
11 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS passim (1953).
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and writing it. As I suggested above, the United States Constitu-
tion can be regarded as a rhetorical text: one that establishes a set
of speakers, roles, topics, and occasions for speech. So understood,
many of its ambiguities and uncertainties become more compre-
hensible, for we can see the text as attempting to establish a con-
versation of a certain kind and its ambiguities as ways of at once
defining and leaving open the topics of the conversation. 12 A stat-
ute can be read similarly, not as a set of orders or directions or
commands, but as establishing a set of topics, a set of terms in
which those topics can be discussed, and some general directions as
to the process of thought and argument by which the statute is to
be applied. Similarly, the judicial opinion, often thought to be the
paradigmatic form of legal expression, might be far more accu-
rately and richly understood if it were seen not as a bureaucratic
expression of ends-means rationality but as a statement by an in-
dividual mind or a group of individual minds exercising their re-
sponsibility to decide a case as well as they can and to determine
what it shall mean in the language of the culture. And the view of
law as constitutive rhetoric should define the lawyer's own work as
far less manipulative, selfish, or goal-oriented than the usual mod-
els, and as far more creative, communal, and intellectually
challenging.
From the point of view of the nonlawyer, this way of regarding
law as rhetoric invites a certain kind of reading and of criticism,
for it invites you to test the law in part by asking whether your
own story, or the story of another in whom you have an interest, is
properly told by these speakers and in this language. The basic
idea of the legal hearing is that two stories will be told in opposi-
tion or competition and a choice made between them. On the rhe-
torical view of law suggested here, you are entitled to have your
story told in your own language (or translated into it), or the law is
failing. It is the role of the jury to insist upon the ultimate trans-
latability of law into the common language of the culture. To ask,
"What place is there for me in this language, this text, this story?,"
and to feel that you have a right to an answer, is a very different
way of evaluating law from thinking of it as a mechanism for dis-
tributing social goods. The central idea is not that of goods, but of
voices and relations: what voices does the law allow to be heard,
what relations does it establish among them? With what voice, or
voices, does the law itself speak? These are the questions with
12 For further discussion, see my WHEN WORDs LosE THEIR MEANING ch. 9 (1984) and
THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 215-40 (1983).
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which rhetorical criticism would begin.
At a more global level, we can see that the current habit of
regarding law as the instrument by which "we" effectuate "our pol-
icies" and get what "we want" is wholly inadequate. It is the true
nature of law to constitute a "we" and to establish a conversation
by which that "we" can determine what our "wants" are and
should be. Our motives and values are not, in this view, to be taken
as exogenous to the system (as they are taken to be exogenous to
an economic system) but are in fact its subject. The law should
take as its most central question what kind of community we
should be, with what values, motives, and aims. It is a process by
which we make ourselves by making our language.
This means that one question constantly before us as lawyers
is what kind of culture we shall have, as well as what kind of com-
munity we shall be. What will be our language of approval and
disapproval, praise and blame, admiration and contempt? What
shall be the terms by which we identify and refine-by which we
create-our motives and combine them into coherent wholes? This
way of conceiving of law invites us to include in our zone of atten-
tion and field of discourse what others, operating under present
suppositions, cut out, including both the radical uncertainty of
most forms of knowledge and the fact that we, and our resources,
are constantly remade by our own collective activities. The pres-
sure of bureaucratic discourse is always to think in terms of ends
and means; but in practice ends-means rationality is likely to un-
dergo a reversal by which only those things can count as ends for
which means of a certain kind exist. This often results in a reduc-
tion of the human to the material and the measurable, as though a
good or just society were a function of the rate of individual con-
sumption, not a set of shared relations, attitudes, and meanings.
To view law as rhetoric might help us to attend to the spiritual or
meaningful side of our collective life.
As one example of what I mean by the difference between the
material and the meaningful, consider the question of the invasion
of privacy by officials. One way to try to compare different regimes
would be to inquire how frequently police officers stopped individ-
uals on the street, asked for their identification, and subjected
them to pat-downs or searches. That would be a material mode of
determining "how much" privacy existed in a particular culture.
But far more important than that is the meaning of the described
activities of the officers both to them and to the citizens. There are
circumstances, war perhaps being the most obvious, in which al-
most everyone would agree that this kind of policing was impor-
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tant and valuable, and citizens would by and large not feel that
their privacy was invaded, because they would feel that the officer
was acting as their fellow worker in a common enterprise.
Such a conception of law as I describe would lead to a rather
different method of teaching it as well. It would at first require a
rather old-fashioned training in the intellectual practices that are
the things that lawyers do, from reading cases to drafting statutes
and contracts. The rhetorician must always start with the materi-
als of his or her language and culture, and we should continue to
train our students to understand these materials, their resources
and limits, and to learn to put them to work in the activities of
narrative and analysis and argument that make up their profes-
sional lives. The rhetorician must first of all master the starting
points from which he or she is to proceed, then the methods by
which he or she can move, in one direction or another, from the
point so established.
But the lawyer's activities of speech and argument should not
merely be learned as crafts to be performed as efficiently as possi-
ble; they should be contrasted with other ways of doing similar
things, drawn both from ordinary life and from other disciplines.
For example, learning how to argue in the law about the meaning
of rules, or about fairness, or about blame, can be informed by at-
tending to the ways in which we already know how to do these
things in ordinary life, and by learning how they are done else-
where. One focus would accordingly be upon the connection be-
tween legal language and ordinary language, legal life and ordinary
life, as rhetoric connects them. A related focus would be upon
other formal intellectual practices, in an interdisciplinary curricu-
lum rather different from current models: not law and sociology or
history or economics or literature, but law as each of these things.
What kind of sociology or history or anthropology are we implicitly
practicing in this legal rule, in that legal action or argument, in
this judicial opinion? What can be said for and against our implied
choices?
But the largest difference would be a shift in the conception of
the triadic relation between the student, the teacher, and the sub-
ject. The law we teach would not be regarded as a set of institu-
tions that "we" manipulate either to achieve "our policies," as gov-
ernors, nor "our interests," as lawyers, but rather as a language
and a community-a world, made partly by others and partly by
ourselves, in which we and others shall live, and which will be
tested less by its distributive effects than by the resources of
meaning it creates and the community it constitutes: who we be-
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come to ourselves and to one another when we converse. 13 And our
central question could become how to understand and to judge
those things.
VII
By this kind of conjunction with the law, rhetoric itself might
perhaps be seen in a somewhat different light. No longer a substi-
tute for science when science does not work, it might be seen as a
science itself, at least in the eighteenth-century meaning of that
term as an organized form of knowledge. It is the knowledge of
who we make ourselves, as individuals and as communities,
through the ways we speak to each other. Rhetorical knowledge is
allied with artistic knowledge in that it is tacitly creative and in
that it acknowledges both its limits and the conditions of uncer-
tainty under which it functions. Rhetorical analysis provides a way
of addressing the central questions of collective existence in an or-
ganized and consistent, but not rule-bound, way. It directs our at-
tention to the most significant questions of shared existence, which
are wholly outside the self-determined bounds of science. Justice
and ethics are its natural subject, art its natural method.
Rhetoric might also provide a set of questions and attitudes
that could enable us to move from one academic and social field to
another and, in doing so, to unite them. For at least tentative judg-
ments of the kind that rhetoric calls for can be made about the
work of experts-in history or psychology, for example-without
one's having to be oneself an expert in the professional sense. Not
that one has not always something to learn-of course one
has-but one can never know everything and ought not be barred
from making important observations and judgments of one kind by
a want of competence at making others. We can say a great deal
about the kind of history written by Gibbon,"' for example-about
the sort of community he establishes with us, about his language of
value and judgment-without being able to make professional
3 I do not mean that distributive effects are irrelevant but that the context in which
they are relevant, and from which they derive their meaning, is social and ethical. What
does it mean about us that power and wealth are divided this way, or that? Or, more pre-
cisely-since power and wealth are at bottom social and cultural-what does it mean about
us that we create these powers, these wealths, in this way? Without a social and ethical
context, one has after all nothing but brute material that has of itself no meaning at all, as
wealth, power, or symbol.
14 EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE
(Londori 1776-1788) (discussed in chapter 7 of my forthcoming book HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS
ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW).
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judgments about his use of certain inscriptions as evidence on a
certain point.
Rhetoric, in the highly expanded sense in which I speak of it,
might indeed become the central discipline for which we have been
looking for so long-which "science" has proven not to be-by
which the others can be defined and organized and judged. One
reason rhetoric might be able to perform this role is its continuity
with ordinary discourse and hence with real communities, real val-
ues, and real politics. It is at least contiguous to a ground that is
common to us all. Rhetoric must deal with ordinary language be-
cause it is the art of speaking to people who already have a lan-
guage, and to reach and to persuade them one must speak their
language.
One result of the affirmation of ordinary language is that it
provides a ground for challenge and change, a place to stand from
which to reformulate any more specialized language. Another re-
sult of this affirmation is that it confirms our right and capacity to
say what we think is really good about what is good in our world
and what is really terrible about what is terrible. Rhetorical analy-
sis invites us to talk about our conceptions of ourselves as individ-
uals and as communities, and to define our values in living rather
than conceptual ways. For example, consider what is good about
America. Our present public rhetoric seems for the most part to
assume that what is good about it is its material productivity. But
that is often wasteful, self-destructive, and ugly. I think what is
really good about this country is its fundamental culture of self-
government, independence, and generosity, and these qualities are
obscured or denied by the way in which we habitually talk about
our government and law.
How does rhetoric enable us to talk about these matters? It
does so by giving us a set of very simple but fundamental ques-
tions to ask when someone speaks either to us or on our behalf, or
when we ourselves speak, such as the following:'
1. The inherited language. What is the language or cul-
ture with which this speaker works? How does it represent
natural and social facts, constitute human motives and values,
and define those persuasive motions of the mind that we call
reason? What does it leave out or deny? What does it over-
specify? What is its actual or imagined relation to other sys-
's These questions focus on the three aspects of the lawyer's rhetorical situation that I
identified supra p. 688-91.
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tems of discourse?
2. The art of the text. How, by what art and with what
effect, is this language remade by this speaker or writer? Is
this text internally coherent, and if so, by what standards of
coherence? Is it externally coherent (that is, does it establish
intelligible relations with its background), and if so, by what
standards of coherence? How, that is, does this text reconsti-
tute its discourse?
3. The rhetorical community. What kind of person is
speaking here, and to what kind of person does he speak?
What is the voice here and what kind of response does it in-
vite, or allow? What place is there for me, and for others, in
the universe defined by this discourse, in the community cre-
ated by this text? What world does it assume? What world
does it create?
Such questions are only the beginning of an ethical and cul-
tural criticism but they may enable us to approach a set of texts as
they are actually made, in widely varying cultures, languages, and
human relations, and to establish connections among them, across
their contexts and above or behind their particularities. To ask
them is of course not to answer them, but it may direct our atten-
tion to the proper place for thought to begin, and suggest, by im-
plication, appropriate modes of inquiry and of judgment.
